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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
TERRI C. HARDY, widow of Bryce 
W. Hardy, deceased. 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
Case No, 
* * * * * 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Is the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in conflict 
with this Court's precedents by ruling that a death resulting from 
drug abuse was accidental, despite the deceased's actual knowledge 
that his continued abuse would result in his death? 
II. Is the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in conflict 
with this Court's precedents by failing to apply the maxim that 
1 
every man must be held to intend the natural and probable 
consequences of his deeds? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Petitioner applies to this Court for review by a Writ of 
Certiorari of the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals. The slip 
opinion of the Court of Appeals is reproduced in the Appendix 
hereto (App. 1-5, hereinafter referred to as "Slip 0p.,f) and is 
reported at 126 U.A.R. 14 (Utah App. 1990). 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals1 decision sought to be reviewed was 
entered on January 25, 1990. On February 20, 1990, this Court 
entered an Order extending the time within which to petition for 
certiorari to March 23, 1990. This Court has jurisdiction to 
review the Court of Appeals' decision by a Writ of Certiorari 
pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, §3; Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(2) ,(3) (a) and (5); and R. Utah S. Ct. 42, 43 and 45. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Terri C. Hardy for insurance 
benefits under an accidental death insurance policy on the life of 
her deceased husband. The case was presented to the trial court 
on a Stipulated Statement of Facts (R. 835). The District Court 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor 
of Mrs. Hardy, holding that Mr. Hardy died as the result of an 
2 
accident (R. 831). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court, 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
• • Br yce W Har d/y (ill eci on September 10, ] 981 as a resul t 
of narcotic intoxication (R 835). For eight years prior to his 
death, Hardy had engaged in an extended course of action in 
misusing and abtis.iin-| druijs IH.H ^ least twc ! occasions 
during this period of time, Hardy was hospitalized and near death 
a s a resuit of narcotic intoxication (R. 838-839). In 197 7, he 
attempted suicide by taking an overdose of Valium and alcohol, and 
again in April 198] , just fi re months before hi s death, he was 
again hospitalized with an overdose Darvon arid Methadone (R 
838-839) , During the course of his continuing abuse of drugs, 
Hardy was repeatedl warned by his physicians and other health 
(R. 838-839) In March 1981, Hardy told a clinical social worker 
that he had a history of drug abuse, that he wanted to di e and 
that Lf he got a chance he won Id k:i I 1 h erased,f. The soci a ] worker 
warned him "that if he did not stop abusing and misusing drugs, he 
would end up killing himself" 838-839). From March 23 to the 
end of May IMCrl l , IfiLitdy was h i.i zed three times tor treatment 
of drug dependency (R. 8 39). On one of those occasions he was 
admitted in omatose state after taking an overdose oi Darvon 
and Methadone i.-.. 840). While hospitalized, he was advised by his 
doctor that "his continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a 
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life-shortening process and that he would be living on borrowed 
time." He was further warned that those "who abuse and misuse 
drugs, in the manner which he had done, live very short lives and 
that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse drugs to the 
degree that Bryce W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of 
thirty" (R. 841). Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of this 
warning and later in his hospitalization expressed his 
understanding and expectation that he would die if he continued to 
abuse drugs. He told a nurse that he would rather be in the 
hospital than be dead (R. 841). 
On the night of September 9, or the morning of September 
10, 1981, Mr. Hardy consumed an undetermined amount of codeine and 
propoxyphene (Darvon), both centrally acting narcotic analgesics, 
and trimethobenzamide (Tigan), an anti emetic agent. The drugs 
were not prescribed by a physician for medical purposes. Mr. 
Hardy died on the morning of September 10, 1981, at the age of 
twenty-nine (R. 836). 
At the time of his death Mr. Hardy was insured by 
Beneficial Life Insurance Company under the terms of two group 
policies. One providing benefits of $25,000.00 in the event of 
death regardless of cause and the other providing a benefit of 
$25,000.00 only in case of accidental death. Plaintiff Terri 
Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies. The benefits 
under the first policy were paid and this action relates to the 
accidental death policy which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
4 
Accidental Death: The Company will pay the 
sum for which application was made by the 
Insured upon receipt of due proof that the 
insured's death resulted, directly and 
independently of all other causes, from 
accidental bodily injury, . . • 
(R. 387) 
The trial court concluded that Mr Hardy's death was 
accidentia I because "the sir ,i pu I ated it act s do not. demons!: rate I, hat 
Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption 
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981" (R. 833). 
jpet.i t ione i .appealed the 1 r i.il eutiii: ' s i;lt;e i s i uni Oi l 
January 25, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. The current 
p e t i t i o n t o t h i s Court i s for review by a Writ of Cert iorar i of 
that d e c i s l o i i. 
ARGUMENT 
T- THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
IS IN CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S 
PRECEDENT ULING THA T A DEATH 
RESULTING FROM DRUG ABUSE WAS 
ACCIDENTAL, DESPITE THE DECEASED'S 
ACTUAL. KNOWLEDGE! THA1!1 HIS CONTINUE!) 
ABUSE WOULD RESULT IN DEATH. 
The Utah Court Appeals, i n i ts decision of January 
2 b , 19 9 0, c o r r e c t L y s t a 1 -. ,t e<i t.u -j 4" M it" . H a rdj knew 
that his continued abuse : drugs would result death at some 
time. (Slip Op. at 4.) xhis Court, in its decis±un in Hoffman v. 
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Life Insurance Co, of North America. 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983) held 
that "a person is a victim of an accident when from the victim's 
point of view, the occurrence causing the injury or death is not 
a natural and probable result of the victim's own acts." 
Conversely, a person is not a victim of an accident when the 
victim knows that his course of conduct will naturally and 
probably result in death. In Hoffman, this Court set forth the 
governing standard as follows: 
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Co.. 
58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 (1921), this Court 
first laid down the standard for defining the 
words "accident or "accidental" as used in an 
accidental death insurance policy. 
The word is descriptive of means which 
produce effects which are not their 
natural and probable consequences.... An 
effect which is the natural and probable 
consequence of an act or course of action 
is not an accident, nor is it produced by 
accidental means. It is either the 
result of actual design, or it falls 
under the maxim that every man must be 
held to intend the natural and probable 
consequence of his deeds. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at 636, 200 P. at 1023 (quoting Western 
Commercial Travelers' Association v. Smith, 85 
F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)). In Richards the 
Court also defined the phrase "natural and 
probable consequence," stating: 
The natural consequence of means used 
[is] the consequence which ordinarily 
follows from their use - the result which 
may be reasonably anticipated from their 
use, and which ought to be expected. The 
probable consequence of the use of given 
means is the consequence which is more 
likely to follow from their use than it 
is to fail to follow. 
Id. 669 P.2d at 415-416. 
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As stated above, not only is an effect which is the 
natural and probable consequence of a single act not an accident, 
but likewise an effect which is the natural and probable 
consequence of a course of action is also not an accident. The 
critical factor in both instances is "whether the event was 
naturally and probably expected or anticipated by the insured." 
Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 416. 
In its analysis, the Utah Court of Appeals found the 
"critical question in this case" to be !'whether Hardy expected 
that the natural and probable result of his ingestion of drugs on 
the evening of September 9 or the morning of September 10, 1981, 
would be his imminent death." (Slip Op* at 3.) The Court of 
Appeals failed to analyze Mr. Hardy's death in light of his course 
of action. 
An examination of the facts in this case, in accordance 
with this Court's holdings in Richards and Hoffman, involves two 
steps. First, a determination of the cause of death, and second, 
a determination of whether death from that cause, from the 
viewpoint of the decedent, was the natural and probable result of 
either a single act by the decedent or of a course of action 
undertaken by the decedent. 
Mr. Hardy died on September 10, 1981, from the misuse 
and abuse of prescription drugs resulting in narcotic 
intoxication. (Stipulated Facts 1, 2, 9, 10, R. 835-37.) The 
sole remaining issue is whether Mr. Hardy's death from this cause 
7 
was expected or anticipated by him. 
As this Court stated in Richards, death is not 
accidental if it is the "natural and probable result of the 
insured's voluntary act unaccompanied by anything unforeseen 
except the death". 58 Utah at 635, 200 P. at 1022. As the 
Stipulated Facts reveal, Mr. Hardy understood "that the probable 
and expected consequence of his continued misuse and abuse of 
drugs would be his untimely death". 
[T]he common meaning of the term 
[accident] is defined in terms of 
whether the event was naturally and 
probably expected or anticipated by 
the insured. 
Where the insured expected or 
anticipated that death would follow 
from his or her conduct recovery 
has been denied. 
. . . . 
Thus, if the insured actually knows 
that his or her death is more likely 
than not to occur, the death is not 
accidental, (emphasis added) 
Hoffman, 669 P.2d at 416, 417, 419. 
As acknowledged by the Court of Appeals, Mr. Hardyfs 
death from the misuse and abuse of drugs was expected by him. 
Thus, by definition, his death cannot be deemed accidental. Yet 
the Court of Appeals, while concluding that Mr. Hardy knew he 
would die from continued drug abuse, has ruled the death as 
accidental. Such a conclusion is clearly erroneous. Applying the 
principles of Richards and Hoffman to the Stipulated Facts of this 
case: "an effect [death from the misuse and abuse of drugs] which 
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is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of 
action [continued drug abuse and misuse over an eight year period 
of time] is not an accident11. 
II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS1 DECISION 
IS IN CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S 
PRECEDENTS BY FAILING TO APPLY THE 
MAXIM THAT EVERY MAN MUST BE HELD TO 
INTEND THE NATURAL AND PROBABLE 
CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DEEDS. 
In Richards, this Court stated that an effect "which is 
the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action 
is not an accident . . . It is either the result of actual design, 
or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to intend 
the natural and probable consequences of his deeds." 58 Utah at 
636, 200 P. at 1023. (Emphasis added) The Court of Appeals 
failed to apply this principle to this ca$e. 
Mr. Hardy understood that death would be the natural and 
probable consequence of continued drug abuse and misuse. 
(Stipulated Fact 29, 34; R. 841-42). The Court of Appeals found 
that Mr. Hardy knew that death would be the result of his 
continued drug abuse "at some time" (Slip Op. at 4) . The court 
went on to rule, however, that it could not be assumed that "Hardy 
intended or expected to die on each occasion when he took drugs. 
. ." (Slip Op. at 4). Such a ruling is not in accord with this 
Court's holding in Richards and Hoffman that an effect which is 
9 
the natural and probable consequence of a course of conduct is not 
an accident and that it must be assumed that the victim intended 
the natural and probable consequences which follow. 
Applying this maxim to Mr. Hardy, he must be held to 
have intended the natural and probable consequences of his deeds 
and therefore he must be held to have intended or expected to die 
on each occasion that he continued to abuse drugs. 
The facts establish that Mr. Hardy continued to abuse 
drugs and that he died as a result of that course of action. He, 
therefore, expected and intended that his consumption of drugs on 
September 9 or 10, 1981, would result in his immediate 
death. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals rested its decision on the 
conclusion that there was "insufficient evidence that Hardy 
expected, with the high level of certainty required by Hoffman, 
that his ingestion of drugs on September 9 or 10, 1981, would lead 
to his immediate death." (Slip Op. at 4.) The prior decisions of 
this Court require a broader inquiry. The critical question is 
whether Mr. Hardy intended or expected to die from the misuse or 
abuse of drugs. If so, and if he died from the abuse of drugs, 
his death was not an accident. The Court of Appeals found that 
Mr. Hardy not only expected, but knew that his continued drug 
abuse would result in his death. His death was, therefore, the 
natural and probable result of his course of action, was not an 
unexpected mishap and was not accidental. 
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Moreover, Mr, Hardy knew that he would die at some time 
if he continued to abuse drugs. Since he did continue to abuse 
drugs and he did die, then he must be held to have intended the 
consequence of his continued drug abuse and his death was not 
accidental. 
Dated this &&^ day of March, 1990. 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
Holdsworth 
George J. Romney 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Terri C. Hardy, widow of Bryce 
W. Hardy, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication)
 s 
Case No. 880464-CA 
F M P n 
•'-
3
 ££«*.> a*^r 
JAN 231990 
<•*»'• Court 
iort «*' Appeals 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Scott Daniels 
Attorneys: George J. Romney and David J. Holdsworth, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
David Eckersley, Donald R. Schow, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant Beneficial Life Insurance Company (Beneficial 
Life) appeals a final judgment awarding Terri C. Hardy 
insurance benefits for the accidental death of her husband, 
Bryce W. Hardy (Hardy). We affirm. 
This case was presented to the trial court on stipulated 
facts, which are summarized below. Hardy died on September 10, 
1981, as a result of narcotic intoxication. Prior to liis 
death, Hardy suffered from and had received treatment for drug 
dependency and abuse. From 1973 to 1976, he used and abused 
Darvon. He was repeatedly warned by his physician that he was 
using excessive amounts of Darvon. In March 1977, Hardy 
attempted suicide by taking an overdose of Valium tablets and 
alcohol. By late 1977, Hardy was abusing controlled drugs 
including codeine, Tylenol 3, Darvon, Tylox, Percodan, and 
Valium. During 1981, Hardy, who was then suffering from back 
pain and internal disorders associated with a diseased 
1 
pancreas, manipulated several doctors to obtain large 
quantities of prescriptions for drugs. In March 1981, a 
clinical social worker warned Hardy -that if he did not stop 
abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself. -
From March 23 to May 31, 1981, Hardy was hospitalized three 
times for treatment of drug dependency. During his treatment, 
Hardy admitted that he was addicted to Valium and Percodan. 
Doctor Robert Crist warned Hardy that -his continued misuse and 
abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and that he 
would be living on borrowed time.- Dr. Crist further warned 
that -those who abuse and misuse drugs, in the manner which he 
had done, live very short lives and that few of those who 
continue to abuse and misuse drugs to the degree that Bryce W. 
Hardy had done lived beyond the age of thirty.- While 
hospitalized, Hardy told a nurse that he would rather be in the 
hospital for a while than dead. 
Terri Hardy testified at trial that on September 9, 1981, 
the evening preceding Hardy's death, he did not appear anxious 
or depressed and he made no statements, oral or written, that 
he intended to commit suicide. She further testified that his 
activities were routine and included making preparations for 
the next day's work at his job, reading to his children, and 
watching television. 
On the night of September 9, or the morning of September 
10, 1981, Hardy took an undetermined amount of drugs including 
codeine, propoxyphene (Darvon), and trimethobenzamide (Tigan). 
The drugs were not prescribed by a physician for medical 
purposes. On the morning of September 10, 1981, Hardy, at the 
age of twenty-nine, died of drug overdose. 
At the time of his death, Hardy was insured by Beneficial 
Life under the terms of two group policies. One provided 
benefits of $25,000 in the event of death regardless of cause 
and the other provided a benefit of $25,000 only in the case of 
accidental death. Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both 
policies. The benefits under the first policy were paid. This 
action relates only to the accidental death policy, which 
states that -[t]he Company will pay the sum for which 
application was made by the Insured upon receipt of due proof 
that the insured's death resulted, directly and independently 
of all other causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . ." 
The trial court concluded that Hardy's death was 
accidental because the stipulated facts did not "demonstrate 
that Mr. Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption 
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981." 
Beneficial Life claims this conclusion is erroneous. 
Because there is no dispute as to the facts, we address a 
purely legal question: under the stipulated facts was the 
death of Bryce from narcotic intoxification by accident within 
the meaning of the life insurance policy? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW| 
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness and are not given special deference. Bountiful v. 
Riley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (1989); Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1378 (Utah 1987). Further, an insurance policy is a form of 
contract and "[q]uestions of contract interpretation not 
requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and 
on such questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no 
presumption of correctness." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
National Am, Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). 
ANALYSIS 
The applicable test, adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co, of N. Am., 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983), 
in determining whether an event is accidental is not whether 
the result is foreseeable, but whether it was expected. The 
court stated: -Thus, since the common meaning of the term 
[accident] is defined in terms of whether the event was 
naturally and probably expected or anticipated by the insured, 
it is that definition which must be applied, and not one 
founded on foreseeability." Ici. at 416 (citations omitted). 
The critical question in this case, therefore, is whether Hardy 
expected that the natural and probable result of his ingestion 
of drugs on the evening of September 9 or the morning of 
September 10, 1981, would be his imminent death. 
By employing an "expectation" standard in determining if 
an event is accidental, Hoffman imposes a high threshold of 
likelihood of injury or death for an event to qualify as a 
nonaccident. "Expected" is a term that "'implies a high degree 
of certainty.#- Id. (quoting Webster's Third International 
Dictionary (1976)). "The 'unexpected event' standard . . . as 
to what constitutes an accident includes not only death 
resulting from conduct of the insured which is negligent, but 
also death resulting from an insured's conduct which is 
reckless." III. at 416-17. 
Beneficial Life claims the death of Hardy was not an 
accident under the terms of the policy. Beneficial Life argues 
that the trial court erred by looking only to the events 
immediately preceding the death, in determining whether death 
880464-CA 3 
was intended or expected. Beneficial Life insists that Hardy's 
death cannot be viewed in a vacuum; based on his long history 
of drug abuse and his knowledge of the threat of death from 
continued abuse, Hardy expected and intended to die on 
September 10, 1981, after he consumed the drugs. 
We find that there is insufficient evidence that Hardy 
expected, with the high level of certainty required by Hoffman, 
that his ingestion of drugs on September 9 or 10, 1981, would 
lead to his immediate death. There is no evidence that Hardy 
intended to commit suicide: there was no note, his activities 
in the evening of September 9, 1981, apparently were routine 
and normal, and there was no indication of depression or 
abnormal behavior. 
Further, we are not persuaded that Hardy's pattern of 
drug abuse and his knowledge of the risks involved is 
sufficient evidence under the Hoffman standard that he expected 
to die from his consumption of drugs on September 9 or 10, 
1981. Admittedly, because Hardy knew that his continued abuse 
would result in death at some time, his act was reckless and 
indicated bad judgment. We cannot assume, however, that Hardy 
intended or expected to die on each occasion when he took drugs 
simply because he failed to heed the warnings of others that he 
should avoid taking narcotics. In fact, Hardy's own extensive 
experience with drug abuse raises the inference that he would 
not believe, with a high degree of certainty, that doing only 
what he had been doing for some years would cause death on 
September 10, 1981. 
Because the evidence does not show that Hardy expected to 
die on September 10, 1981, from his ingestion of drugs, we find 
that the trial court did not err in determining that Hardy's 
death was not accidental under the terms of the insurance 
policy. Our decision is consistent with the majority of 
jurisdictions that have faced this issue. Death from overdose, 
absent affirmative evidence that the insured intended death, is 
almost invariably treated as accidental. See, e.g., O'Toole v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1982); Minton v. 
Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 373 F.Supp. 33, 35 (D. Nev. 1974); 
Pilcfrer v, New YQXK iiife Insf COt, 25 Cal. App. 3d 717, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 82, 87-88 (1972); Russell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 108 111. App. 3d 417, 439 N.E.2d 89, 91-93 (1982); Miller 
v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 358 N.E.2d 258, 259-60 
(N.Y. 1976); Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 225 
A.2d 532, 535-37 (1976)A 
Finally, we note a fundamental principle operative in 
this case: "any ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an 
880464-CA 4 
insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage. Also, 
since the policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are 
construed against that party.- LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. 
QQ^., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Because the insurance 
policy language in this case is, at best, ambiguous with regard 
to drug overdose and death, we construe the policy in favor of 
coverage. Insurance companies are free to incorporate policy 
exclusions for death from drug overdose and if they do not 
elect to do so, the courts should not write such an exclusion 
into the policy. O'Toole, 671 F.2d at 915; Miller, 358 N.E.2d 
at 260-61. M[T]he absence of a specific exclusion in the 
policy drawn by the insurer supports a liberal interpretation 
of the coverage.- Minton, 373 F.Supp. at 35. 
Affirmed. 
^ y 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
<.*-,.•'" •».«* 
LJ£-
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. There are cases which hold that death from drug overdose 
which is the unexpected result of a wholly intentional act is 
not a death from accidental means. These jurisdictions 
distinguish death by -accident- and death incurred by 
-accidental means.- See, e.g.. Hargreaves v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 3d 703, 163 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1980); 
Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 Md. 320, 260 A.2d 338 
(1970). "Even when applying the means test, however, the 
courts nevertheless have held consistently that where the 
voluntary action consisted of an unintentional overdose of 
drugs, the resulting death occurred by an accidental means." 
Pilcher v. New York Life Ins. Co., 2 5 Cal. App. 3d 717, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (1972). 
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George J. Romney (2789) 
David J. Hdldsworth (4052) 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
700 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple 
Salt Ia3ce City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 321-7800 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, widow of 
ERYCE W. HARDY, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
STTPUIATED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Civil No. C-83-6569 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record M. David 
Eckersley, and the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record George 
J. Romney, stipulate as follows: 
1. Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981, as a result of a 
narcotic intoxication resulting from ingestion of drugs which nay lawfully 
be obtained only by prescription. 
2. The Utah State Medical Examiner's report listed the cause of 
death as a 'combined codeine, propoxyphene and trimothobenzamide 
intoxication" and the Medical Examiner described the manner of death as 
'Undetermined'', as distinguished from 'Accident", 'Suicide", "Homicide' and 
"Natural causes". A copy of the Autopsy Report and Toxicology Report are 
attached as Exhibit "A". The Certificate of Death listed the cause of 
death as "Combined codeine, propoxyphene & trimothobenzamide intoxication" 
QQVHnS 
occurring from the "Ingestion of drugs" and described the manner of death 
as "Undetermined if injured Accidentally or Purposely" as distinguished 
frcm "Accident", "Suicide", "Homicide" and "Pending Investigation", A copy 
of the Death Certificate is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
3. Following Mr, Hardy's death the Plaintiff, Terri C, Hardy, and 
her friend Julie Shepherd gave written statements to the police describing 
the events preceding and immediately following Mr. Hardy's death. Copies 
of these statements are attached as Exhibits "C", "D", and "E". 
4. The Mt, Pleasant City Police Department prepared an Incident 
Report describing events on the morning of Mr, Hardy's death, A copy of 
said report is attached as Exhibit "F". 
5. Plaintiff's evidence would show that on the evening preceding 
his death, Mr, Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he made no 
statements, oral or written, reflecting any intention to take his own life. 
His activities, as observed by his wife, Terri Hardy, were routine and 
included making preparations for the next day's work at his job, reading to 
his children and watching television. Defendant has no evidence to 
contradict such evidence. 
6. On the night of September 9, 1981, or the morning of September 
10, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an undetermined amount of drugs cxmtaining 
codeine, propoxyphene (Darvon) and trimethobenzamide (Tigan). 
7. Codeine is a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Propoxyphene 
is also a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Trimethobenzamide is an 
anti emetic agent. 
8. The quantity of drugs ingested by Mr. Hardy prior to his death 
is not able to be determined from the autopsy, toxicological analysis or 
00CS2£ 
j any other existing data. 
9. There is no evidence of Bryoe Hardy having obtained by 
o 11 prescription the drugs which he ingested on the occasion of his death. 
J 10. Defendant's evidence would shew that the ingested drugs were 
^ self administered and were not prescribed by a physician for medical 
purposes and constituted an abuse and misuse of prescription drugs. 
Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. The ingested drugs 
were taken despite treatment which Mr. Hardy had received for withdrawal 
frcm his addiction to such drugs and in contravention of the warnings and 
counseling which he had received to stop taking such drugs. 
11. At the time of his death Mr. Haindy was insured by Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company under the terms of two group policies. One 
providing benefits of $25/000.00 in the event of death regardless of cause 
and the other providing a benefit of $25,000.00 only in case of accidental 
death. Plaintiff Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies. 
The benefits under the first policy were paid and this action relates to 
the accidental death policy which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
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Accidental Death: The Company will pay the sum for 
18 which application was made by the Insured upon 
receipt of due proof that the insured's death 
19 resulted, directly and independently of all other 
causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . . 
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12. Prior to Bryce Hardy's death, he had been diagnosed as 
suffering from and had received treatment for drug dependency and abuse. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" are copies of medical reports and 
prescription records relating thereto. 
13. Mr. Hardy began using Darvon (a ttfade name for propoxyphene) by 
November, 1973. By November 1974, Mr. Hardy was abusing Darvon. During 
00CS27 
6 
I the years 1974, 1975, and 1976, Mr. Hardy was repeatedly counseled and 
9 warned by his physician that he was using excessive amounts of Darvon. 
3 14. In March 1977, Mr. Hardy attexrpted to canrait suicide by taking 
J an overdose of Vadium (a centrally acting tranquilizing depressant) tablets 
J and alcohol and was transported by ambulance to a hospital in a comatose 
state. During this time period Mr. Hardy was very despondent about the 
-II failure of his first marriage. 
jj 15. In 1979, while employed as a miner with Etoery Mining Caipany, 
J Mr. Hardy was involved in an accident which injured his back. He received 
prescriptions for drugs for treatment of his back pain. At other times, 
Mr. Hardy also received prescriptions for drugs for treatment of internal 
disorders associated with a diseased pancreas. 
16. By late 1979, Mr. Hardy was dependent an, and misusing arri 
abusing narcotic drugs including codeine, Tylenol 3 (a combination of 
aretanincphen and codeine), Darvon (propoxyphene), Ty l o x (a trade name for 
oxycodone, a semi synthetic narcotic analgesic), Peroodan (also a trade 
name for oxycodone) and Valiunu 
17. During 1980, and 1981, Mr. Hardy manipulated several doctors to 
obtain prescriptions for narcotic drugs. As a result of these 
manipulations he was able to obtain large quantities of prescription drugs 
which he abused and misused. 
18. In March, 1981, Don C. Lankford, a Clinical Social Worker and 
Certified Social Worker, met on three occasions with Mr. Hardy at the 
request of Dr. Jackson who was considering performing back surgery on Mr. 
Hardy. At the first meeting, Mr. Lankford administered a test kncwn as the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). In their second 
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meeting Mr. lankford discussed the results of the MMPI test. At that time 
Mr. Hardy stated that he had a history of drug abuse and that he was 
continuing to abuse and itrisnsft drugs. He further stated that he had 
previously attempted suicide and that if he got a chance, he would kill 
himself and that he wanted to die. Mr. lankford told Mr. Hardy "that if he 
did not stop abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself.'' 
Mr. lankford further advised Mr. Hardy to seek help at the St. Benedict's 
Hospital or at his local mental health oenter for his serious drug 
problems. After his meetings with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford advised Dr. 
Jackson against performing surgery on Mr. Hardy and that surgery was never 
performed. At the time Mr. Lankford met with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford was 
of the opinion that Mr. Hardy understood the counsel which he had given him 
and the consequences of his continued misuse and abuse of drugs. 
Defendant's evidence would be as set foifth in the Affidavit of Don 
Lankford, attached hereto as Exhibit "R". Plaintiff has no evidence to 
contradict such evidence. 
19. On three occasions in the spfing of 1981, Mr. Hardy was 
hospitalized for treatment of prescription drug dependency. 
20. Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in Mountain View Hospital from March 
23, 1981, to March 28, 1981, and showed a marked dependency on drugs such 
as Darvon, lylox, Percodan and Amitriptyline (an antidepressant). He 
requested high dosages of narcotic analgesics, but was taken off all 
narcotic analgesics. When the narcotic analgesics were withdrawn Mr. Hardy 
became hostile and irritable but later expressed gratitude for being helped 
to rid himself of his dependency on such drugs. 
21. After his discharge from Mountain View Hospital in late March 
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1981, Mr. Hard/ reverted to his old pattern of drug misuse and abuse. 
22. On April 14, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an overdose of Darvon and 
Methadone (a synthetic narcotic analgesic). The overdose caused his body 
to go into respiratory arrest. When his wife, Terri, observed Mr. Hardy in 
respiratory arrest she tried to wake him up and when he didn't respond she 
called an ambulance. He was taken by ambulance to Sanpete Valley Hospital 
and admitted in a coiwtnse state. 
23. On the morning of April 15, 1981, medical personnel at Sanpete 
Valley Hospital offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug rehabilitation 
center but Mr. Hardy refused and indicated he preferred to stay in the 
hospital. 
24. On the morning of April 17, 1981, medical personnel at the 
Sanpete Valley Hospital again offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug 
rehabilitation center. 
25. On April 17, 1981, Mr. Hardy left Sanpete Valley Hospital 
without a discharge order but soon telephoned back for help. He expressed 
willingness to go to a drug rehabilitation center and arrangements were 
made through the Manti Mental Health Center to transfer him to the Drug 
Rehabilitation Program in the Psychiatric Department of Utah Valley 
Hospital. Mr. Hardy voluntarily admitted himself to that program on April 
17, 1981, for treatment of drug abuse. 
26. While in Utah Valley Hospital from April 17, 1981, to April 27, 
1981, Mr. Hardy admitted to various physicians and other medical personnel 
that he was addicted to Valium and Peroodan, that he had used 12 Valium 
tablets a day, that he had gone to many doctors to get drugs, that he had 
used approximately 15-20 Peroodan tablets a day, and that when Peroodan was 
u 00CS40 
not available he used lyiox if TyLax was available. 
27. While in the hospital front April 17, 1981, to April 27, 1981, 
the amounts of narcotic analgesics supplied to Mr. Hardy were gradually 
reduced until discontinued entirely. 
28. In the course of Mr. Hardy's treatment at the Utah Valley 
Hospital in April 1981, Dr. Robert Crist advised Mr. Hardy that "his 
continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and 
that he would be living on borrowed time." Dr. Crist advised him that 
"those vftio abuse and Tnireisp drugs, in the manner which he had done, live 
very short lives and that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse 
drugs to the degree that Bryoe W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of 
thirty." Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of the advice given by Dr. 
Crist. Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of 
Robert Crist, M.D., attached hereto as Exhibit "I". Plaintiff has no 
evidence to contradict such evidence. 
29. Wiile in Utah Valley Hospital in April 1981, Mr. Hardy 
expressed to a nurse, Diane Sandstrcni Nance, his understanding that he 
needed to overcame his drug abuse problem, otherwise he would die as a 
result of his misuse and abuse of drugs. Diane Nance noted in the 
Inpatient Psychiatric Nurses Notes as follows: 
[Mr. Hardy] came to sane conclusions in group 
therapy. [He] decided to let his wife knew and 
help her to understand his reasons for being here. 
That even though she needs him at heme new, in the 
long run he needs to be here. He said he'd rather 
be here for awhile than be dead. 
30. On his release from Utah Valley Hospital on April 27, 1981, Mr. 
Hardy was referred to the Central Utah Mental Health Clinic for outpatient 
treatment of drug abuse. 
7 
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j I] 31. After his discharge frtxn Utah Valley Hospital in late April 
21| 1981, Mr. Hardy again reverted to drug abuse and misuse. 
3 32. Fran May 21, 1981, to May 31, 1981, Mr. Hardy was again 
s hospitalized in Utah Valley Hospital for treatment for drug abuse. 
£ 33. While in Utah Valley Hospital in late May 1981, Mr. Hardy was 
6|| again counseled and admonished about his drug problem. 
34. Hardy was a person of normal intelligence and was not suffering 
from any mental disease or defect during his life or at the time of his 
death which prohibited him from understanding the warnings which he had 
received relating to continued drug abuse and misuse or from understanding 
that the probable and expected consequence of continued misuse and abuse of 
drugs would be his untimely death. Mr. Hardy expressed an understanding of 
the counsel and warnings given to him by these health care professionals 
regarding the dangers of his continued drug abuse and misuse and there is 
no evidence that at the time of his death he was not able to comprehend the 
consequences of his acts. Defendant's evidence would also be as set forth 
in the Affidavit of Bryan S. Finkle, attached hereto as Exhibit "J". 
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Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. 
DATED this — day of January, 1988. 
HCUPT & ECKERSIZY 
2311 M. David Eckersley 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
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rtLtu IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sail Lake County Utah 
FEB 10 7933 
H. Dixcn Kincflcy. Clerk 3rc Dist. Court 
By £ — O A - ' I . ' ^ . ^ 
J Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SHE THIRD JUDICIAL DISIRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT IAKE GOUNIY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, ET AL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE INTRY 
CASE NO. C-83-6569 
Ihe Court having heard argument, having considered the memorandum and 
the points and authorities filed by each party herein, and having read the 
authorities cited to the Court rules herein as follows. The Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgement is denied. The Court having read the 
authorities is of the opinion that the actions of the decedant in taking 
drugs, which ultimately caused his death, was not intended by the victim at 
the time that the drugs were taken to cause his death. Ihe Court is of the 
opinion that Hoffman v. Life Insurance Ccnpany of North America, 669 P. 2d 
410 (Utah, 1983) and the standards set forth in Richards v. Standard 
Accident Insurance Ccnpany 58 Utah 662, 200 P. 1017 (1921) govern herein. 
It was in Richards that our Supreme Court first established the standard for 
defining the words "accident" or "accidental." It was there said, "the word 
is descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their natural 
15 QGCS2& 
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and probable consequences...." It was further said there, "It is either the 
result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be 
held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his deeds." Hoffman 
then goes en to cite numerous cases in which the Richard's Standard had been 
applied consistently by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
The argument between the parties here relates to, in effect, a time 
continuum. It would be the argument of the defense that Mr. Hardy's taking 
of drugs knewing that continued drug usage over a period of time would 
shorten his life, perhaps to the point where he would die before the age of 
30 (which he in fact did), or that he oould die at probably any time after 
ingesting drugs would not meet the definition of accident in Hoffman and 
Richards. Hcwever, the problem is that under the Hoffman definition, his 
taking of the drugs either must be the intended result or one which was 
"...the natural and probable consequences of his deeds." There is no 
evidence of intention in this case. As a matter of fact, the presumption is 
against an attempted suicide and, thus, the latter phrase must be looked to. 
While the Court could believe under sane circumstances that a person 
intended to die by taking excessive drugs given, the facts of this case 
relating to Mr. Hardy's prior attenpts at rehabilitation, his work pattern 
the day before his death, and the activities carried on the evening before 
his death, it is difficult for this Court to find as a matter of law that 
the victim (through whose eyes we must see in order to determine the intent) 
intended to die by taking drugs as he did. This is particularly true given 
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the general attitude of most humans who undertake something risky. It is 
for the thrill of the risk and surviving it that the act is undertaken. It 
is seldan intended, e&though it might be anticipated, that injury or death 
might arise. 
The Plaintiff »s attorney will prepare the order denying Summary 
Judgement. ^ 
Dated this f day of February, 1988. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
Deputy blerfc 
17 nof%»/>p 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct, postage prepaid copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry was mailed to: 
George Fanney, Esq. 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tcwer 
60 East South Terrple 
Salt lake City, UT 84111 
David J. Hbldsworth 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tcwer 
60 East Scxith Tenple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Virginius Dahney, Esq. 
Kearns Building - Suite 412 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, OT 84101 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
419 Boston Building 
Salt lake City, UT 84111 
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'."ICE 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-0453 
MAY 9 1S83 
H. Dixon 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
CO. , 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No: C-83-6569 
This matter was submitted to the Court upon stipulated 
facts. Trial was held on January 27, 1988, with plaintiff being 
represented by David Eckersley and defendant by George J. 
Romney. The Court, having reviewed the stipulation and attached 
exhibits, and having considered the arguments and memoranda 
of counsel hereby enters the following order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the facts to be those set forth in 
the stipulation executed by the parties and filed with the Court 
on January 27, 1988. 
00^9 7 r> 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
As the stipulated facts do not demonstrate that 
Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption 
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981, the Court 
concludes that Mr. Hardy's death was the result of accidental 
bodily injury within the meaning of the insurance policy in 
question. 
JUDGMENT 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff 
Terri C. Hardy and against defendant Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company in the amount of $25,000.00, together with prejudgment 
interest at the rate of 107o per annum from November 10, 1981 
until the date of this Judgment. 
DATED this V day of May, 1988. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed this ^ 4 l day of April, 1988, to the 
following: 
George J. Romney 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
60 East South Temple 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY^ 
